Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Verskil tussen weergawes
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Lyn 41:
Hy trou in 1811. In 1812 verskyn die eerste deel van sy ''Wissenschaft der Logik'' (Wetenskap van Logika). Die tweede deel verskyn in 1813 en die derde deel in 1816. In 1816 is Hegel as professor aan die Universiteit van Heidelberg aangestel. Daarna het hy 'n aanbod van die Universiteit van Berlyn van die hand gewys. In 1817 verskyn die eerste deel van ''Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften'' (Ensiklopedie van die Filosofiese Wetenskappe). Nadat [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte|Fichte]] oorlede is, volg Hegel hom in 1818 as rektor van die Berlynse universiteit op. In 1820 verskyn sy ''Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts'' (Elemente van die Filosofie van die Reg). Verder gee hy lesings oor die filosofie van die geskiedenis, wat postuum as ''Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte'' gepubliseer is.
Teen die einde van 1822 reis Hegel na Nederland. In 1823 gee hy lesings in [[estetika]]. Teen die einde van sy lewe gee hy klas op natuurfilosofie, godsdiensfilosofie en [[logika]]. In 1831 begin hy met 'n hersiening van sy ''Phänomenologie'', maar is kort daarna oorlede.
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== Philosophical work ==
{{Hegelianism}}
=== Freedom ===
Hegel's thinking can be understood as a constructive development within the broad tradition that includes [[Plato]] and [[Immanuel Kant]]. To this list, one could add [[Proclus]], [[Meister Eckhart]], [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]], [[Plotinus]], [[Jakob Böhme]], and [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]]. What all these thinkers share, which distinguishes them from [[materialists]] like [[Epicurus]] and [[Thomas Hobbes]] and from [[empiricists]] like [[David Hume]], is that they regard freedom or self-determination both as real and as having important [[ontology|ontological]] implications for soul or mind or divinity. This focus on freedom is what generates Plato's notion (in the ''[[Phaedo]]'', ''[[The Republic (Plato)|Republic]]'' and ''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]'') of the [[Soul (spirit)|soul]] as having a higher or fuller kind of reality than inanimate objects possess. While [[Aristotle]] criticizes Plato's "Forms", he preserves Plato's cornerstones of the ontological implications for self-determination: ethical reasoning, the soul's pinnacle in the hierarchy of nature, the order of the cosmos and an assumption with reasoned arguments for a prime mover. Kant imports Plato's high esteem of individual sovereignty to his considerations of moral and noumenal freedom as well as to God. All three find common ground on the unique position of humans in the scheme of things, known by the discussed categorical differences from animals and inanimate objects.
In his discussion of "Spirit" in his ''Encyclopedia'', Hegel praises Aristotle's ''[[On the Soul]]'' as "by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic".<ref>par. 378</ref> In his ''[[The Phenomenology of Spirit|Phenomenology of Spirit]]'' and his ''[[Science of Logic]]'', Hegel's concern with Kantian topics such as freedom and morality and with their ontological implications is pervasive. Rather than simply rejecting Kant's dualism of freedom versus nature, Hegel aims to subsume it within "true infinity", the "Concept" (or "Notion": ''Begriff''), "Spirit" and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given".
The reason why this subsumption takes place in a series of concepts is that Hegel's method in his ''Science of Logic'' and his ''Encyclopedia'' is to begin with basic concepts like "Being" and "Nothing" and to develop these through a long sequence of elaborations, including those already mentioned. In this manner, a solution that is reached in principle in the account of "true infinity" in the ''Science of Logic'''s chapter on "Quality" is repeated in new guises at later stages, all the way to "Spirit" and "ethical life" in the third volume of the ''Encyclopedia''.
In this way, Hegel intends to defend the germ of truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like those of materialism and empiricism. Like Plato, with his dualism of soul versus bodily appetites, Kant pursues the mind's ability to question its felt inclinations or appetites and to come up with a standard of "duty" (or, in Plato's case, "good") which transcends bodily restrictiveness. Hegel preserves this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite (a process that Hegel in fact relates to "freedom" and the "ought"),<ref name=miller>See ''Science of Logic'', trans. Miller [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1989]</ref>{{rp|133–136, 138}} the universal going beyond the particular (in the Concept) and Spirit going beyond Nature. Hegel renders these dualities intelligible by (ultimately) his argument in the "Quality" chapter of the "Science of Logic". The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole. This is because as Hegel suggests by his introduction of the concept of "reality",<ref name=miller/>{{rp|111}} what determines itself—rather than depending on its relations to other things for its essential character—is more fully "real" (following the Latin etymology of "real", more "thing-like") than what does not. Finite things do not determine themselves because as "finite" things their essential character is determined by their boundaries over against other finite things, so in order to become "real" they must go beyond their finitude ("finitude is only as a transcending of itself").<ref name=miller/>{{rp|145}}
The result of this argument is that finite and infinite—and by extension, particular and universal, nature and freedom—do not face one another as two independent realities, but instead the latter (in each case) is the self-transcending of the former.<ref name=miller/>{{rp|146}} Rather than stress the distinct singularity of each factor that complements and conflicts with others—without explanation—the relationship between finite and infinite (and particular and universal and nature and freedom) becomes intelligible as a progressively developing and self-perfecting whole.
=== Progress ===
The mystical writings of [[Jakob Böhme]] had a strong effect on Hegel.<ref>[[Jon Mills (psychologist)|Jon Mills]], ''The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel's Anticipation of Psychoanalysis'', SUNY Press, 2002, p. 16.</ref> Böhme had written that the [[Fall of Man]] was a necessary stage in the [[evolution]] of the [[universe]]. This evolution was itself the result of God's desire for complete self-awareness. Hegel was fascinated by the works of Kant, Rousseau and [[Johann Wolfgang Goethe]] and by the [[French Revolution]]. Modern philosophy, culture and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, [[Philosophy of self|self]] and [[Other (philosophy)|Other]], freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, or the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] and [[Romanticism]]. Hegel's main philosophical project was to take these contradictions and tensions and interpret them as part of a comprehensive, evolving, rational unity that in different contexts he called "the absolute Idea" (''[[Science of Logic]]'', sections 1781–1783) or "absolute knowledge" (''[[Phenomenology of Spirit]]'', "(DD) Absolute Knowledge").
According to Hegel, the main characteristic of this unity was that it evolved through and manifested itself in [[contradiction]] and negation. Contradiction and negation have a dynamic quality that at every point in each domain of [[reality]]—[[consciousness]], history, philosophy, art, nature and society—leads to further development until a [[rationality|rational]] unity is reached that preserves the contradictions as phases and sub-parts by lifting them up (''[[Aufheben|Aufhebung]]'') to a higher unity. This whole is mental because it is mind that can comprehend all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same, underlying, [[logic]]al, developmental order underlies every domain of reality and is ultimately the order of self-conscious rational thought, although only in the later stages of development does it come to full self-consciousness. The rational, self-conscious [[wikt:whole|whole]] is not a thing or [[being]] that lies outside of other existing things or minds. Rather, it comes to completion only in the philosophical comprehension of individual existing human minds who through their own understanding bring this developmental process to an understanding of itself. Hegel's thought is revolutionary to the extent that it is a philosophy of absolute negation—as long as absolute negation is at the center, systematization remains open, and makes it possible for human beings to become subjects.<ref name="Schroeder2000">{{cite book|author=Steven Schroeder|title=Between Freedom and Necessity: An Essay on the Place of Value|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JfT6aQvkVfAC&pg=PA104|accessdate=2012-12-17|year=2000|publisher=Rodopi|isbn=978-90-420-1302-5|page=104}}</ref>
"Mind" and "Spirit" are the common English translations of Hegel's use of the German "[[Geist]]". Some{{Who|date=December 2012}} have argued that either of these terms overly "psychologize" Hegel,{{citation needed|date=February 2007}} implying a kind of disembodied, solipsistic consciousness like [[ghost]] or "soul". Geist combines the meaning of spirit—as in god, ghost, or mind—with an intentional force. In Hegel's early philosophy of nature (draft manuscripts written during his time at the University of Jena), Hegel's notion of "Geist" was tightly bound to the notion of "[[Aether (classical element)|Aether]]", from which Hegel also derived the concepts of [[space]] and [[time]], but in his later works (after Jena) he did not explicitly use his old notion of "Aether" anymore.<ref>Stefan Gruner: "Hegel's Aether Doctrine", [[VDM Publishing|VDM Publ]]., 2010, {{ISBN|978-3-639-28451-5}}</ref>
Central to Hegel's [[Conception (idea)|conception]] of [[knowledge]] and mind (and therefore also of reality) was the notion of [[Identity (philosophy)|identity]] in [[Subtraction|difference]]—that is, that mind [[Externalization|externalizes]] itself in various forms and [[object (philosophy)|objects]] that stand outside of it or opposed to it; and that through recognizing itself in them, is "with itself" in these external manifestations so that they are at one and the same time mind and other-than-mind. This notion of identity in difference, which is intimately bound up with his conception of contradiction and negativity, is a principal feature differentiating Hegel's thought from that of other philosophers.{{Citation needed|date=June 2016}}
=== Civil society ===
{{see also|Civil society}}
Hegel made the distinction between civil society and state in his ''[[Elements of the Philosophy of Right]]''.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/preface.htm|title=Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Preface|last=Hegel, G. W. F.|website=www.marxists.org}}</ref> In this work, civil society (Hegel used the term "''bürgerliche Gesellschaft''" though it is now referred to as ''Zivilgesellschaft'' in German to emphasize a more inclusive community) was a stage in the [[dialectical|dialectical relationship]] that occurs between Hegel's perceived opposites, the macro-community of the [[State (polity)|state]] and the micro-community of the family.<ref>Pelczynski, A.Z.; 1984; 'The Significance of Hegel's separation of the state and civil society' pp1-13 in Pelczynski, A.Z. (ed.); 1984; ''The State and Civil Society''; Cambridge University Press</ref> Broadly speaking, the term was split, like Hegel's followers, to the [[political left]] and [[political right|right]]. On the left, it became the foundation for [[Karl Marx]]'s civil society as an [[base and superstructure|economic base]];<ref name="glob">{{cite journal | last = Zaleski | first = Pawel | authorlink = | title = Tocqueville on Civilian Society. A Romantic Vision of the Dichotomic Structure of Social Reality | journal = Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte | volume = 50 | issue = | pages = | year = 2008 | url = | doi = | id = | accessdate = }}</ref> to the right, it became a description for all non-state (and the state is the peak of the objective spirit) aspects of society, including culture, society and politics. This liberal distinction between [[political society]] and [[civil society]] was followed by [[Alexis de Tocqueville]].<ref name="glob" /> In fact, Hegel's distinctions as to what he meant by civil society are often unclear. For example, while it seems to be the case that he felt that a civil society such as the German society in which he lived was an inevitable movement of the dialectic, he made way for the crushing of other types of "lesser" and not fully realized types of civil society as these societies were not fully conscious or aware—as it were—as to the lack of progress in their societies. Thus, it was perfectly legitimate in the eyes of Hegel for a conqueror such as Napoleon to come along and destroy that which was not fully realized.
=== State ===
Hegel's State is the final culmination of the embodiment of freedom or right (''Rechte'') in the ''[[Elements of the Philosophy of Right]].'' The State subsumes family and civil society and fulfills them. All three together are called "ethical life" (''[[Sittlichkeit]]''). The State involves three "[[wikt:moment#Noun|moments]]". In a Hegelian State, citizens both know their place and choose their place. They both know their obligations and choose to fulfill their obligations. An individual's "supreme duty is to be a member of the state" (''Elements of the Philosophy of Right'', section 258). The individual has "substantial freedom in the state". The State is "objective spirit" so "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" (section 258). Furthermore, every member both loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended mere "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship. Members of a Hegelian State are happy even to sacrifice their lives for the State.
=== Heraclitus ===
According to Hegel, "[[Heraclitus]] is the one who first declared the nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process. The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle".<ref>{{cite web|author=Hegel, G. W. F.|title=Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie|year=1979|pages=336–337|url=http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich/Vorlesungen+%C3%BCber+die+Geschichte+der+Philosophie/Erster+Teil%3A+Griechische+Philosophie/Erster+Abschnitt.+Von+Thales+bis+Aristoteles/Erstes+Kapitel.+Von+Thales+bis+Anaxagoras/D.+Philosophie+des+Heraklit | accessdate=2008-07-01}}</ref> For Hegel, Heraclitus's great achievements were to have understood the nature of the infinite, which for Hegel includes understanding the inherent contradictoriness and negativity of reality; and to have grasped that reality is becoming or process and that "being" and "nothingness" are mere empty abstractions. According to Hegel, Heraclitus's "obscurity" comes from his being a true (in Hegel's terms "speculative") philosopher who grasped the ultimate philosophical truth and therefore expressed himself in a way that goes beyond the abstract and limited nature of common sense and is difficult to grasp by those who operate within common sense. Hegel asserted that in Heraclitus he had an antecedent for his logic: "[...] there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my logic".<ref>{{cite book | first=Justus | last=Hartnack |others=Lars Aagaard-Mogensen (trans.) | title=An Introduction to Hegel's Logic | year=1998 | publisher=Hackett Publishing | isbn=978-0-87220-424-9| pages=16–17}} Hartnack quotes Hegel, ''Lectures on the History of Philosophy'', Volume I.</ref>
Hegel cites a number of fragments of Heraclitus in his ''Lectures on the History of Philosophy''.<ref>{{cite web | author=Hegel, G. W. F. | title=Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie | year=1979 | pages=319–343 | url=http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich/Vorlesungen+%C3%BCber+die+Geschichte+der+Philosophie/Erster+Teil%3A+Griechische+Philosophie/Erster+Abschnitt.+Von+Thales+bis+Aristoteles/Erstes+Kapitel.+Von+Thales+bis+Anaxagoras/D.+Philosophie+des+Heraklit | accessdate=2008-07-01}}</ref> One to which he attributes great significance is the fragment he translates as "Being is not more than Non-being", which he interprets to mean the following: <blockquote>''Sein und Nichts sei dasselbe''<br>Being and non-being are the same.</blockquote>
Heraclitus does not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and in that fragment seems to be opposing any identity A to any other identity B, C and so on, which is not-A. However, Hegel interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but indeterminate or "pure" [[being]] without [[particular]]ity or specificity.<ref>{{cite book | first=Frederick Charles | last=Copleston | pages=Chapter X | year=2003 | publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group | isbn=978-0-8264-6901-4 | nopp=true | title=A History of Philosophy: Volume 7: 18th and 19th century German philosophy}}</ref> Pure being and pure non-being or nothingness are for Hegel pure abstractions from the reality of becoming and this is also how he interprets Heraclitus. This interpretation of Heraclitus cannot be ruled out, but even if present is not the main gist of his thought.
For Hegel, the inner movement of reality is the process of God thinking as manifested in the evolution of the universe of nature and thought; that is, Hegel argued that when fully and properly understood, [[reality]] is being [[Idealism|thought]] by God as manifested in a person's comprehension of this process in and through philosophy. Since human thought is the image and fulfillment of God's thought, God is not [[Ineffability|ineffable]] (so incomprehensible as to be unutterable), but can be understood by an analysis of thought and reality. Just as humans continually correct their concepts of reality through a [[dialectic|dialectical process]], so God himself becomes more fully manifested through the dialectical process of becoming.
For his god, Hegel does not take the logos of Heraclitus but refers rather to the [[nous]] of [[Anaxagoras]], although he may well have regarded them the same as he continues to refer to god's plan, which is identical to God. Whatever the nous thinks at any time is actual [[Substance theory|substance]] and is identical to limited being, but more remains to be thought in the substrate of non-being, which is identical to pure or unlimited thought.
The universe as becoming is therefore a combination of being and non-being. The particular is never complete in itself, but to find completion is continually transformed into more comprehensive, complex, self-relating particulars. The essential nature of being-for-itself is that it is free "in itself;" that is, it does not depend on anything else such as matter for its being. The limitations represent fetters, which it must constantly be casting off as it becomes freer and more self-determining.<ref>The notable Introduction to ''Philosophy of History'' expresses the historical aspects of the dialectic.</ref>
Although Hegel began his philosophizing with commentary on the Christian religion and often expresses the view that he is a Christian, his ideas of God are not acceptable to some Christians even though he has had a major influence on 19th- and 20th-century theology.
=== Religion ===
As a graduate of a Protestant seminary, Hegel's theological concerns were reflected in many of his writings and lectures.<ref>"[T]he task that touches the interest of philosophy most nearly at the present moment: to put God back at the peak of philosophy, absolutely prior to all else as the one and only ground of everything." (Hegel, "How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy as displayed in the works of Mr. Krug", ''Kritisches Journal der Philosophie'', I, no. 1, 1802, pp. 91–115)</ref> Hegel's thoughts on the person of [[Jesus|Jesus Christ]] stood out from the theologies of the Enlightenment. In his posthumously published ''[[Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion]], Part 3'', Hegel is shown as being particularly interested with the demonstrations of God's existence and the ontological proof.<ref>Jon Bartley Stewart. 2008. ''[[Johan Ludvig Heiberg (poet)|Johan Ludvig Heiberg]]: Philosopher, Littérateur, Dramaturge, and Political Thinker.'' Museum Tusculanum Press. p. 100</ref> He espouses that "God is not an abstraction but a concrete God [...] God, considered in terms of his eternal Idea, has to generate the Son, has to distinguish himself from himself; he is the process of differentiating, namely, love and Spirit". This means that Jesus as the Son of God is posited by God over against himself as other. Hegel sees both a relational unity and a metaphysical unity between Jesus and God the Father. To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and human. Hegel further attests that God (as Jesus) not only died, but "[...] rather, a reversal takes place: God, that is to say, maintains himself in the process, and the latter is only the death of death. God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed".
The philosopher [[Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)|Walter Kaufmann]] has argued that there was great stress on the sharp criticisms of traditional Christianity appearing in Hegel's so-called early theological writings. Kaufmann admits that Hegel treated many distinctively Christian themes and "sometimes could not resist equating" his conception of spirit (Geist) "with God, instead of saying clearly: in God I do not believe; spirit suffices me".<ref>Walter Kaufmann, ''Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary'', Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965, pp. 276–77</ref> Kaufmann also points out that Hegel's references to God or to the divine—and also to spirit—drew on classical Greek as well as Christian connotations of the terms. Kaufmann goes on:
<blockquote>In addition to his beloved Greeks, Hegel saw before him the example of Spinoza and, in his own time, the poetry of Goethe, Schiller, and Hölderlin, who also liked to speak of gods and the divine. So he, too, sometimes spoke of God and, more often, of the divine; and because he occasionally took pleasure in insisting that he was really closer to this or that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his time, he has sometimes been understood to have been a Christian.<ref>[[Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)|Walter Kaufmann]], ''Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary'', Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965, p. 277</ref></blockquote>
According to Hegel himself, his philosophy was consistent with Christianity.<ref>Jon Bartley Stewart. 2008. Johan Ludvig Heiberg: Philosopher, Littérateur, Dramaturge, and Political Thinker. Museum Tusculanum Press. p. 100</ref> This led Hegelian philosopher, jurist and politician {{Interlanguage link multi|Carl Friedrich Göschel|de}} (1784–1861) to write a treatise demonstrating the consistency of Hegel's philosophy with the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the human soul. Göschel's book on this subject was titled ''Von den Beweisen für die Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele im Lichte der spekulativen Philosophie: eine Ostergabe'' (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1835).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://reader.digitale-sammlungen.de/de/fs1/object/display/bsb10043317_00005.html|title=MDZ-Reader – Band – Von den Beweisen für die Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele im Lichte der spekulativen Philosophie / Göschel, Carl Friedrich|website=reader.digitale-sammlungen.de}}</ref><ref>In the 1870s and 1880s, Rev. T. R. Vickroy and Susan E. Blow—who were both minor associates of the St. Louis Hegelians—independently of each other translated various chapters from Göschel's book into English, and had their translations published in ''The Journal of Speculative Philosophy''. ''The Journal of Speculative Philosophy'' (in print from 1867–1893) was the official journal of the St. Louis Philosophical Society. The St. Louis Philosophical Society—the organization which served as the hub of the St. Louis Hegelians—had been co-founded in January 1866 by 2 disciples of Hegel in America, William Torrey Harris (1835–1909) and [[Henry Conrad Brokmeyer]] (1826–1906). Rev. Thomas Rhys Vickroy (1833–1904), a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church, had been the first president (1866–1871) of Lebanon Valley College in Annville, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania. While President at Lebanon Valley College, Vickroy also held various professorships there. For example, one year he was Professor of Philosophy and the Greek Language and Literature, and another year he was Professor of Belles-Lettres and Philosophy. Susan Elizabeth Blow (1843–1916) was an educator who in 1873 opened the first successful public kindergarten in the U. S.—in the Des Peres School, in the Carondelet neighborhood of St. Louis, Missouri.</ref><ref>Jon Bartley Stewart. 2008. ''Johan Ludvig Heiberg: Philosopher, Littérateur, Dramaturge, and Political Thinker''. Museum Tusculanum Press. p. 105</ref>
Hegel seemed to have an ambivalent relationship with [[Magic (supernatural)|magic]], [[myth]] and [[Paganism]]. He formulates an early philosophical example of a [[disenchantment]] narrative, arguing that Judaism was responsible both for realizing the existence of ''Geist'' and, by extension, for separating nature from ideas of spiritual and magical forces and challenging [[polytheism]].<ref>{{Cite book | last = Josephson-Storm | first = Jason | title = The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences | location = Chicago | publisher = University of Chicago Press | date = 2017 |pages = 85–86 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=xZ5yDgAAQBAJ | isbn = 978-0-226-40336-6 }}</ref> However, Hegel's manuscript "[[The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism]]" suggests that Hegel was concerned about the perceived decline in myth and enchantment in his age, and that he therefore called for a "new myth" to fill the cultural vacuum.<ref>Josephson-Storm (2017), pp. 85–86.</ref>
Hegel continued to develop his thoughts on religion both in terms of how it was to be given a 'wissenschaftlich', or "theoretically rigorous," account in the context of his own "system," and, most importantly, with how a fully modern religion could be understood.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Hegel – A Biography|last=Pinkard|first=Terry|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2000|isbn=0521-49679-9|location=United States|page=576}}</ref>
== Works ==
Hegel published four works during his lifetime:
# ''[[The Phenomenology of Spirit]]'' (or ''The Phenomenology of Mind''), his account of the evolution of consciousness from sense-perception to absolute knowledge, published in 1807.
# ''[[Science of Logic]]'', the logical and [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] core of his philosophy, in three volumes (1812, 1813 and 1816, respectively), with a revised first volume published in 1831.
# ''[[Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences]]'', a summary of his entire philosophical system, which was originally published in 1816 and revised in 1827 and 1830.
# ''[[Elements of the Philosophy of Right]]'', his political philosophy, published in 1820.
=== Posthumous works ===
During the last ten years of his life, Hegel did not publish another book, but thoroughly revised the ''Encyclopedia'' (second edition, 1827; third, 1830).<ref>W. Kaufmann (1980), ''Discovery of the Mind 1: Goethe, Kant and Hegel'', p. 203</ref> In his political philosophy, he criticized [[Karl Ludwig von Haller]]'s reactionary work, which claimed that laws were not necessary. He also published some articles early in his career and during his Berlin period. A number of other works on the [[philosophy of history]], [[Philosophy of religion|religion]], [[aesthetics]] and the [[history of philosophy]]{{sfn|Hegel|1996}} were compiled from the lecture notes of his students and published posthumously.
* {{cite book|last1=Hegel|first1=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich|authorlink=Georg Hegel|editor-last= Haldane|editor-first=Elizabeth Sanderson|editor-link=Elizabeth Haldane|title=Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie|trans-title=Hegel's Lectures on the history of philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=P1oQAQAAIAAJ|date= 1996|origyear=1892 Kegan Paul|publisher=[[Humanities Press International]]|isbn=978-0-391-03957-5|ref=harv}} ([https://archive.org/details/lecturesonhisto00hegegoog full text at] [[Internet Archive]]) (see also [[Lectures on the History of Philosophy]])
== Legacy ==
{{more citations needed|section|date=August 2017}}<!-- Lots of paragraphs that have no citations.
[[File:Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - Dorotheenstädtischer Friedhof - Berlin, Germany - DSC00377.JPG|thumb|left|Hegel's tombstone in Berlin]]
{{see also|Hegelianism}}
There are views of Hegel's thought as a representation of the summit of early 19th-century Germany's movement of philosophical [[idealism]]. It would come to have a profound impact on many future philosophical schools, including schools that opposed Hegel's specific [[dialectical idealism]], such as [[existentialism]], the [[historical materialism]] of Marx, [[historism]] and [[British idealism|British Idealism]].
Hegel's influence was immense both within philosophy and in the other sciences. Throughout the 19th century many chairs of philosophy around Europe were held by Hegelians and [[Søren Kierkegaard]], [[Ludwig Feuerbach]], [[Karl Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels]]—among many others—were all deeply influenced by, but also strongly opposed to many of the central themes of Hegel's philosophy. Scholars continue to find and point out Hegelian influences and approaches in a wide range of theoretical and/or learned works, such as [[Carl von Clausewitz]]'s ''magnum opus'' on strategic thought, ''[[On War]]'' (1831).<ref>Cormier, Youri. [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.2013.859166?tab=permissions#.U9etAfldXGA "Hegel and Clausewitz: Convergence on Method, Divergence on Ethics"], ''International History Review'', Volume 36, Issue 3, 2014.</ref> After less than a generation, Hegel's philosophy was suppressed and even banned by the [[Prussia]]n [[right-wing]] and was firmly rejected by the [[left-wing]] in multiple official writings.
After the period of [[Bruno Bauer]], Hegel's influence waned until the philosophy of British Idealism and the 20th-century Hegelian [[Western Marxism]] that began with [[György Lukács]]. In the United States, Hegel's influence is evident in [[pragmatism]]. The more recent movement of [[communitarianism]] has a strong Hegelian influence.
=== Reading Hegel ===
Some of Hegel's writing was intended for those with advanced knowledge of philosophy, although his ''Encyclopedia'' was intended as a textbook in a [[university]] [[course (education)|course]]. Nevertheless, Hegel assumes that his readers are well-versed in [[Western philosophy]]. Especially crucial are [[Aristotle]], [[Immanuel Kant]] and Kant's immediate successors, most prominently [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]] and [[Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling]]. Those without this background would be well-advised to begin with one of the many general introductions to his thought. As is always the case, difficulties are magnified for those reading him in translation. In fact, Hegel himself argues in his ''Science of Logic'' that the German language was particularly conducive to philosophical thought.<ref>Hegel, G.W.F. ''Science of Logic''. trans. George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010. p.12</ref>
According to Walter Kaufmann, the basic idea of Hegel's works, especially the ''Phenomenology of Spirit'', is that a philosopher should not "confine him or herself to views that have been held but penetrate these to the human reality they reflect". In other words, it is not enough to consider propositions, or even the content of consciousness; "it is worthwhile to ask in every instance what kind of spirit would entertain such propositions, hold such views, and have such a consciousness. Every outlook in other words, is to be studied not merely as an academic possibility but as an existential reality".<ref>W. Kaufmann (1966), ''Hegel: A Reinterpretation'', Anchor, p. 115</ref> Kaufmann has argued that as unlikely as it may sound, it is not the case that Hegel was unable to write clearly, but that Hegel felt that "he must and should not write in the way in which he was gifted".<ref>W. Kaufmann, 1966, ''Hegel: A Reinterpretation'', p. 99</ref>
=== Left and right Hegelianism ===
Some historians have spoken of Hegel's influence as represented by two opposing camps. The [[Right Hegelians]], the allegedly direct disciples of Hegel at the [[Humboldt University of Berlin|Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität]], advocated a [[Protestant]] orthodoxy and the [[political conservatism]] of the post-[[Napoleon I of France|Napoleon]] Restoration period. Today this faction continues among conservative Protestants, such as the [[Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod]], which was founded by missionaries from Germany when the Hegelian Right was active. The [[Young Hegelians|Left Hegelians]], also known as the Young Hegelians, interpreted Hegel in a [[revolutionary]] sense, leading to an advocation of [[atheism]] in religion and [[liberal democracy]] in politics.
In more recent studies, this paradigm has been questioned.<ref>[[Karl Löwith]], ''From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought'', translated by David E. Green, New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.</ref> No Hegelians of the period ever referred to themselves as "Right Hegelians", which was a term of insult originated by [[David Strauss]], a self-styled Left Hegelian. Critiques of Hegel offered from the Left Hegelians radically diverted Hegel's thinking into new directions and eventually came to form a disproportionately large part of the literature on and about Hegel.<ref name="ReferenceA">''The Universal Mind: The Evolution of Machine Intelligence and Human Psychology'', by Xiphias Press</ref>
The Left Hegelians also influenced Marxism, which has in turn inspired global movements, from the [[Russian Revolution (1917)|Russian Revolution]], the [[Chinese Revolution (1949)|Chinese Revolution]] and myriad of practices up until the present moment.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>
20th-century interpretations of Hegel were mostly shaped by [[British idealism]], [[logical positivism]], [[Marxism]] and [[Fascism]]. According to [[Benedetto Croce]], the [[Italian Fascist]] [[Giovanni Gentile]] "holds the honor of having been the most rigorous neo-Hegelian in the entire history of Western philosophy and the dishonor of having been the official philosopher of Fascism in Italy".<ref>[[Benedetto Croce]], ''Guide to Aesthetics'', Translated by Patrick Romanell, "Translator's Introduction", The Library of Liberal Arts, The Bobbs–Merrill Co., Inc., 1965</ref> However, since the fall of the Soviet Union a new wave of Hegel scholarship arose in the West without the preconceptions of the prior schools of thought. {{Interlanguage link multi|Walter Jaeschke|de}} and [[Otto Pöggeler]] in Germany as well as Peter Hodgson and [[Howard Kainz]] in the United States are notable for their recent contributions to post-Soviet Union thinking about Hegel.
=== Triads ===
{{main|Thesis, antithesis, synthesis}}
In previous modern accounts of Hegelianism (to undergraduate classes, for example), especially those formed prior to the Hegel renaissance, Hegel's [[dialectic]] was most often characterized as a three-step process, "[[thesis, antithesis, synthesis]]"; namely, that a "thesis" (e.g. the [[French Revolution]]) would cause the creation of its "antithesis" (e.g. the [[Reign of Terror]] that followed) and would eventually result in a "synthesis" (e.g. the [[constitutional state]] of free citizens). However, Hegel used this classification only once and he attributed the terminology to Kant. The terminology was largely developed earlier by Fichte. It was spread by [[Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus]] in accounts of Hegelian philosophy and since then the terms have been used as descriptive of this type of framework.
The "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" approach gives the sense that things or ideas are contradicted or opposed by things that come from outside them. To the contrary, the fundamental notion of Hegel's dialectic is that things or ideas have internal contradictions. From Hegel's point of view, analysis or comprehension of a thing or idea reveals that underneath its apparently simple identity or unity is an underlying inner contradiction. This contradiction leads to the dissolution of the thing or idea in the simple form in which it presented itself and to a higher-level, more complex thing or idea that more adequately incorporates the contradiction. The triadic form that appears in many places in Hegel (e.g. being–nothingness–becoming, immediate–mediate–concrete and abstract–negative–concrete) is about this movement from inner contradiction to higher-level integration or unification.
For Hegel, reason is but "speculative", not "dialectical".<ref>''Hegel and Language'', edited by Jere O'Neill Surber. [https://books.google.com/books?id=HFpQHr07IAkC&pg=PA238 p. 238].</ref> Believing that the traditional description of Hegel's philosophy in terms of thesis–antithesis–synthesis was mistaken, a few scholars like [[Raya Dunayevskaya]] have attempted to discard the triadic approach altogether. According to their argument, although Hegel refers to "the two elemental considerations: first, the idea of freedom as the absolute and final aim; secondly, the means for realising it, i.e. the subjective side of knowledge and will, with its life, movement, and activity" (thesis and antithesis), he does not use "synthesis", but instead speaks of the "Whole": "We then recognised the State as the moral Whole and the Reality of Freedom, and consequently as the objective unity of these two elements". Furthermore, in Hegel's language the "dialectical" aspect or "moment" of thought and reality, by which things or thoughts turn into their opposites or have their inner contradictions brought to the surface, what he called ''[[Aufheben|Aufhebung]]'', is only preliminary to the "speculative" (and not "synthesizing") aspect or "moment", which grasps the unity of these opposites or contradiction.
It is widely admitted today that the old-fashioned description of Hegel's philosophy in terms of thesis–antithesis–synthesis is inaccurate. Nevertheless, such is the persistence of this misnomer that the model and terminology survive in a number of scholarly works.<ref>{{cite book|author=Gustav E. Mueller|editor=Jon Stewart|title=The Hegel Myths and Legends|url=|accessdate=|year=1996|publisher=Northwestern University Press|isbn=978-0-8101-1301-5|page=301}}</ref>
=== Renaissance ===
In the last half of the 20th century, Hegel's philosophy underwent a major renaissance. This was due to (a) the rediscovery and re-evaluation of Hegel as a possible philosophical progenitor of Marxism by philosophically oriented Marxists; (b) a resurgence of the historical perspective that Hegel brought to everything; and (c) an increasing recognition of the importance of his [[dialectical method]]. [[György Lukács]]' ''[[History and Class Consciousness]]'' (1923) helped to reintroduce Hegel into the Marxist canon. This sparked a renewed interest in Hegel reflected in the work of [[Herbert Marcuse]], [[Theodor W. Adorno]], [[Ernst Bloch]], [[Raya Dunayevskaya]], [[Alexandre Kojève]] and [[Gotthard Günther]] among others. In ''[[Reason and Revolution]]'' (1941), [[Herbert Marcuse]] made the case for Hegel as a revolutionary and criticized [[Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse]]'s thesis that Hegel was a totalitarian.<ref>{{cite book | first=Paul | last=Robinson | title=The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse | year=1990 | publisher=Cornell University Press | isbn=978-0-87220-424-9| page=156}}</ref> The Hegel renaissance also highlighted the significance of Hegel's early works, i.e. those written before ''[[The Phenomenology of Spirit]]''. The direct and indirect influence of Kojève's lectures and writings (on ''The Phenomenology of Spirit'' in particular) mean that it is not possible to understand most French philosophers from [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] to [[Jacques Derrida]] without understanding Hegel.<ref>French philosopher [[Vincent Descombes]] introduced the term "post-Kojèvian discourse" to designate the period of French philosophy after the 1930s (Vincent Descombes, ''Modern French Philosophy'', Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 158–159).</ref> American [[neoconservative]] [[political science|political theorist]] [[Francis Fukuyama]]'s controversial book ''[[The End of History and the Last Man]]'' (1992) was heavily influenced by Kojève.<ref>{{cite book | first=Howard | last=Williams |author2=David Sullivan |author3=Gwynn Matthews | title=Francis Fukuyama and the End of History | year=1997 | publisher=University of Wales Press | isbn=978-0-7083-1428-9 | pages=70–71}}</ref> The Swiss theologian [[Hans Küng]] has also advanced contemporary scholarship in Hegel studies.{{citation needed|date=May 2017}}
Beginning in the 1960s, Anglo-American Hegel scholarship has attempted to challenge the traditional interpretation of Hegel as offering a metaphysical system: this has also been the approach of [[Z. A. Pelczynski]] and [[Shlomo Avineri]]. This view, sometimes referred to as the "non-metaphysical option", has had a decided influence on many major English language studies of Hegel in the past forty years.
Late 20th-century literature in Western [[Theology]] that is friendly to Hegel includes works by such writers as [[Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)|Walter Kaufmann]] (1966), [[Dale M. Schlitt]] (1984), [[Theodore Geraets]] (1985), [[Philip M. Merklinger]] (1991), [[Stephen Rocker]] (1995) and [[Cyril O'Regan]] (1995).
Two prominent American philosophers, [[John McDowell]] and [[Robert Brandom]] (sometimes referred to as the "[[University of Pittsburgh|Pittsburgh]] Hegelians"), have produced philosophical works exhibiting a marked Hegelian influence. Each is avowedly influenced by the late [[Wilfred Sellars]], also of Pittsburgh, who referred to his seminal work ''Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'' (1956) as a series of "incipient ''Méditations Hegeliennes''" (in homage to [[Edmund Husserl]]'s 1931 work, ''[[Cartesian Meditations|Méditations cartésiennes]]''). In a separate Canadian context, [[James Doull]]'s philosophy is deeply Hegelian.
Beginning in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, a fresh reading of Hegel took place in the West. For these scholars, fairly well represented by the Hegel Society of America and in cooperation with German scholars such as Otto Pöggeler and Walter Jaeschke, Hegel's works should be read without preconceptions. Marx plays little-to-no role in these new readings. Some American philosophers associated with this movement include [[Lawrence Stepelevich]], [[Rudolf Siebert]], Richard Dien Winfield and Theodore Geraets.{{citation needed|date=May 2017}}
=== Criticism ===
Criticism of Hegel has been widespread in the 19th and the 20th centuries. A diverse range of individuals including [[Arthur Schopenhauer]], [[Karl Marx]], [[Søren Kierkegaard]], [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], [[Bertrand Russell]], [[G. E. Moore]], [[Franz Rosenzweig]], [[Eric Voegelin]] and [[A. J. Ayer]] have challenged Hegelian philosophy from a variety of perspectives. Among the first to take a critical view of Hegel's system was the 19th-century German group known as the [[Young Hegelians]], which included Feuerbach, Marx, Engels and their followers. In Britain, the Hegelian [[British idealism]] school (members of which included [[Francis Herbert Bradley]], [[Bernard Bosanquet (philosopher)|Bernard Bosanquet]] and in the United States [[Josiah Royce]]) was challenged and rejected by [[analytic philosophy|analytic]] philosophers Moore and Russell. In particular, Russell considered "almost all" of Hegel's doctrines to be false.<ref>B. Russell, ''History of Western Philosophy'', chapter 22, paragraph 1, p. 701.</ref> Regarding Hegel's interpretation of history, Russell commented: "Like other historical theories, it required, if it was to be made plausible, some distortion of facts and considerable ignorance".<ref>Russell, 735.</ref> [[Logical positivism|Logical positivists]] such as Ayer and the [[Vienna Circle]] criticized both Hegelian philosophy and its supporters, such as Bradley.
Hegel's contemporary Schopenhauer was particularly critical and wrote of Hegel's philosophy as "a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real thinking".<ref>On the Basis of Morality.</ref> In 1820, Schopenhauer became a lecturer at the [[Humboldt University of Berlin|University of Berlin]] and he scheduled his lectures to coincide with those of Hegel, whom Schopenhauer had also described as a "clumsy charlatan".<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur. Author's preface to "On The Fourfold Root of the Principle of sufficient reason. p. 1. [[:s:On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason|On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason]]</ref> However, only five students ended up attending Schopenhauer's lectures so he dropped out of [[academia]]. Kierkegaard criticized Hegel's "absolute knowledge" unity.<ref>Søren Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscriptt</ref> The physicist and philosopher [[Ludwig Boltzmann]] also criticized the obscure complexity of Hegel's works, referring to Hegel's writing as an "unclear thoughtless flow of words".<ref>Ludwig Boltzmann, ''Theoretical physics and philosophical problems: Selected writings'', p. 155, [[D. Reidel]], 1974, {{ISBN|90-277-0250-0}}</ref> In a similar vein, Robert Pippin notes that some view Hegel as having "the ugliest prose style in the history of the German language".<ref>Robert B. Pippin, ''Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 5</ref> Russell wrote in ''[[A History of Western Philosophy]]'' (1945) that Hegel was "the hardest to understand of all the great philosophers".<ref>{{cite book|last=Russell|first=Bertrand|title=A History of Western Philosophy|date=1972|page=730}}</ref> Karl Popper quoted Schopenhauer as stating, "Should you ever intend to dull the wits of a young man and to incapacitate his brains for any kind of thought whatever, then you cannot do better than give Hegel to read...A guardian fearing that his ward might become too intelligent for his schemes might prevent this misfortune by innocently suggesting the reading of Hegel."<ref>{{cite book |last=Popper |first=Karl|title=The Open Society And Its Enemies |url=https://books.google.com/?id=_M_E5QczOBAC |publisher=Routledge |page=287 |isbn=9784624010522|date=2012-11-12}}</ref>
[[Karl Popper]] wrote that "there is so much philosophical writing (especially in the Hegelian school) which may justly be criticised as meaningless verbiage".<ref>Karl Popper, ''Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge'' (New York: Routledge, 1963), 94.</ref> Popper also makes the claim in the second volume of ''[[The Open Society and Its Enemies]]'' (1945) that Hegel's system formed a thinly veiled justification for the [[Absolute monarchy|absolute rule]] of [[Frederick William III of Prussia|Frederick William III]] and that Hegel's idea of the ultimate goal of history was to reach a [[sovereign state|state]] approximating that of 1830s [[Prussia]]. Popper further proposed that Hegel's philosophy served not only as an inspiration for [[communism|communist]] and [[fascism|fascist]] totalitarian governments of the 20th century, whose dialectics allow for any belief to be construed as rational simply if it could be said to exist. Kaufmann and [[Shlomo Avineri]] have criticized Popper's theories about Hegel.<ref>See for instance Walter Kaufmann (1959), [http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/kaufmann.htm ''The Hegel Myth and Its Method'']</ref>
[[Isaiah Berlin]] listed Hegel as one of the six architects of modern [[authoritarianism]] who undermined [[liberal democracy]], along with Rousseau, [[Claude Adrien Helvétius]], Fichte, [[Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon|Saint-Simon]] and [[Joseph de Maistre]].<ref>Berlin, Isaiah, ''Freedom and Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty'' (Princeton University Press, 2003)</ref>
Voegelin argued that Hegel should be understood not as a philosopher, but as a "sorcerer", i.e. as a [[mysticism|mystic]] and [[Hermeticism|hermetic]] thinker.<ref>Voegelin, Eric (1972). "On Hegel—A Study in Sorcery", in J. T. Fraser, F. Haber & G. Muller (eds.), ''The Study of Time''. Springer-Verlag. 418--451 (1972)</ref> This concept of Hegel as a hermetic thinker was elaborated by Glenn Alexander Magee,<ref>Magee, Glenn Alexander (2001), ''Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition'', Ithaca: Cornell University Press</ref> who argued that interpreting Hegel's body of work as an expression of mysticism and hermetic ideas leads to a more accurate understanding of Hegel.<ref>"I do not argue that merely that we ''can'' understand Hegel as a Hermetic thinker, just as we can understand him as a German or a Swabian or an idealist thinker. Instead, I argue that we ''must'' understand Hegel as a Hermetic thinker, if we are to truly understand him at all." Magee 2001, p. 2.</ref>
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== Werke ==
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