What Is It Like to Be a Bat?: Verskil tussen weergawes

"'''What Is It Like to Be a Bat?'''"("'''Hoe voel dit om 'n vlermuis te wees?'''") is 'n referaat van die Amerikaanse filosoof [[Thomas Nagel]] wat aanvanklik in ''The Philosophical Review'' (Oktober 1974) en later in Nagel se ''Mortal Questions'' (1979) gepubliseer is. Die referaat stel verskeie probleme voor wat opduik as gevolg van [[bewussyn]], insluitend die moontlike onoplosbaarheid van die gees-liggaam-probleem as gevolg van “feite buite die bereik van menslike begrippe”, die grense van objektiwiteit en [[reduksionisme]], die “fenomenologiese kenmerke” van subjektiewe ervaring, die grense van menslike verbeelding, en wat dit beteken om 'n spesifieke, bewuste ding te wees.<ref name="Thomas Nagel 2010, p. 637">{{cite book|editor-first=Ted |editor-last=Honderich|title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy|url=http://www.philosopher.eu/others-writings/nagel-what-is-it-like-to-be-a-bat/|date=10 Maart 2005|publisher=Oxford University Press|location= Oxford|isbn=978-0-19-103747-4|first=Thomas |last=Nagel|p= 637}}</ref> Nagel konstateer (in Engels) dat ''"an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to ''be'' that organism—something it is like ''for'' the organism."'' <ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Nagel | first1 = Thomas | year = 1974 | title = What Is It Like to Be a Bat? | journal = The Philosophical Review | volume = 83 | issue = 4| pages = 435–450 | doi=10.2307/2183914 | jstor=2183914 |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=fBGPBRX3JsQC|page=165}}}}</ref> Hierdie verklaring het 'n spesiale status in bewussynstudies behaal as ''die standaard 'hoe dit is' frase.'' <ref>Levine, Joseph (2010). Review of Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. ''Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews'' 2010 (3).</ref> Alhoewel [[Daniel Dennett]] nie oor sommige beweringe saamstem nie, het hy Nagel se referaat erken as "die mees aangehaalde en invloedrykste denkeksperiment oor bewussyn."<ref name=Dennett1991>{{cite book|last1=Dennett|first1=Daniel C.|title=[[Consciousness Explained]]|date=1991|publisher=Little, Brown and Company|location=Boston}}</ref>{{rp|441}} Peter Hacker ontleed die uitspraak van Nagel as nie net "verkeerd gekonstrueer" nie, maar filosofies "verkeerd bedink" as 'n definisie van bewussyn;<ref name=Hacker2002>{{cite journal |author-link= Peter Hacker |last= Hacker |first= P.M.S. |url= http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/To%20be%20a%20bat.pdf |format= pdf |title= Is there anything it is like to be a bat? |journal= Philosophy |volume= 77 |date= 2002 |pages= 157–174 |doi=10.1017/s0031819102000220}}</ref> hy voer aan dat Nagel se referaat "die grondslag gelê het vir ... veertig jaar se nuwe verwarring oor bewussyn."<ref name=Hacker2012>{{cite journal |author-link= Peter Hacker |last= Hacker |first= P.M.S. |url= http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/ConsciousnessAChallenge.pdf |format= pdf |title= The Sad and Sorry History of Consciousness: being, among other things, a challenge to the “consciousness-studies community” |journal= Royal Institute of Philosophy | volume=supplementary volume 70 |date= 2012 }}</ref>{{rp|13}}