Slag van Verdun: Verskil tussen weergawes
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Lyn 44:
<blockquote>"Die linie in Frankryk het breekpunt bereik. 'n Massadeurbraak – wat in elk geval buite ons vermoë is – is onnodig. Doelwitte is binne ons bereik waarteen die Franse Generale Staf noodgedwonge elke man tot hul beskikking in die veld sal moet stoot. As hulle dit doen, sal dit die Franse magte doodbloei."</blockquote>
Onlangse ontledings volg dieselfde pad en sluit die tradisionele uitleg uit. Die offensief was dalk beplan om Verdun se verswakte verdediging te verpletter en dit dan in te neem en die hele front oop te maak. Verdun, as die kern van 'n uitgebreide spoorstelsel, sou die Duitsers geweldig gehelp het.
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▲However, recent scholarship by [[Holger Afflerbach]] and others has questioned the veracity of this so-called "Christmas memo".<ref> Holger Afflerbach: Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (München: Oldenbourg, 1994); "Planning Total War? Falkenhayn and the Battle of Verdun, 1916," in Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, Roger Chickering and Stig Foerster, eds. (New York: Cambridge, 2000)</ref> No copy has ever surfaced and the only account of it appeared in Falkenhayn's post-war memoir. His army commanders at Verdun, including the German Crown Prince, denied any knowledge of a plan based on attrition. Afflerbach argues that it seems likely that Falkenhayn did not specifically design the battle to bleed the French Army, but justified ''ex-post-facto'' the motive of the Verdun offensive, despite its failure.
==Battle==
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